Some game theory of Greenland
It is commonly assumed that the U.S. “acquiring” Greenland, whatever that might mean, will result in greater U.S. control of the territory. Along some dimensions that is likely. But it is worth pondering the equilibrium here more seriously.
I observe, in many locations around the world, that indigenous groups end up with far more bargaining power than their initial material resources might suggest. For instance, in the United States Native Americans often (not always) can exercise true sovereignty. The AARP cannot (yet?) say the same. In Mexico, indigenous groups have blocked many an infrastructure project.
One reason for these powers is that, feeling outmatched, the indigenous groups cultivate a temperament of “orneriness” and “being difficult.” Some of that may be a deliberate strategic stance, some of it may be heritage from having been treated badly in the past and still lacking trust, and some of it may, over time, be acquired culture as the strategic stance gets baked into norms and behavior patterns.
Often, in these equilibria, the more nominal power you have over the indigenous group, the more orneriness they will have to cultivate. If you only want a few major concessions, sometimes you can get those better as an outsider. A simple analogy is that sometimes a teenager will do more to obey a grandparent than a parent. Fewer issues of control are at stake, and so more concessions are possible, without fear of losing broader autonomy.
So a greater American stake in Greenland, however that comes about, may in some regards end up being counterproductive. And these factors will become more relevant as more resource and revenue control issues come to the table. For some issues it may be more useful having Denmark available as “the baddie.”
It is worth thinking through these questions in greater detail.
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